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Abstract—As deep learning classifiers continue to mature,
model providers with sufficient data and computation resources
are exploring approaches to monetize the development of increas-
ingly powerful models. Licensing models is a promising approach,
but requires a robust tool for owners to claim ownership of
models, i.e. a watermark. Unfortunately, current watermarks are
all vulnerable to piracy attacks, where attackers embed forged
watermarks into a model to dispute ownership.
We believe properties of persistence and piracy resistance are
critical to watermarks, but are fundamentally at odds with the
current way models are trained and tuned. In this work, we
propose two new training techniques (out-of-bound values and
null-embedding) that provide persistence and limit the training
of certain inputs into trained models. We then introduce wonder
filters, a new primitive that embeds a persistent bit-sequence
into a model, but only at initial training time. Wonder filters
enable model owners to embed a bit-sequence generated from
their private keys into a model at training time. Attackers cannot
remove wonder filters via tuning, and cannot add their own
filters to pretrained models. We provide analytical proofs of
key properties, and experimentally validate them over a variety
of tasks and models. Finally, we explore a number of adaptive
counter-measures, and show our watermark remains robust.
I. INTRODUCTION
Building deep neural networks (DNNs) is an expensive
process. It requires significant resources, both in terms of
extremely large training datasets and powerful computing
resources. For example, Googles InceptionV3 model, first
proposed in 2015, is based on a sophisticated architecture with
48 layers, trained on ∼1.28M labeled images over 2 weeks on
8 GPUs. Each new generation of models increases significantly
in data and computational costs. As a result, model training
is increasingly limited to a small group of companies with
sufficient access to both data and computation.
As the costs of these models continue to rise, model
providers are exploring multiple approaches to monetize mod-
els to recoup their training costs. These include Machine
Learning as a Service (MLaaS) platforms (e.g. [17], [33])
that host models, as well as fee-based licensing of pretrained
models. Both approaches have serious limitations. Hosted
models are vulnerable to a number of model inversion or
inference attacks (e.g. [7], [25], [29]), while model licensing
requires a robust and persistent proof of ownership of the
model.
Ideally, DNN watermarks are capable of providing the proof
of model ownership necessary for model licensing. Upon
demand, a robust watermark would provide a persistent and
verifiable link between the model (or any derivatives) and its
owner. Such a watermark would require three properties. First,
it needs to provide a strongly verifiable link between an owner
and the watermark (authentication). Second, a watermark
needs to be persistent, so that it cannot be corrupted, removed
or manipulated by an attacker (persistence). Finally, it should
be unforgeable, such that an attacker cannot add additional
watermarks of their own to a model in order to dispute
ownership (piracy-resistance).
Unfortunately, current proposals fall far short of achieving
these properties. Three earlier proposals [3], [27], [34] suggest
inserting classification rules and artifacts into the model.
Unfortunately, in each case, there is nothing to prove the
relationship between the watermark and the owner. More
importantly, the artifacts can be identified by studying the
model itself ([34] requires applying a backdoor detection
method such as [4], [26], [30] or [8]). Alternatively, if there
is no trusted third party, an attacker can simply force the
owner to reveal the watermark by challenging ownership. Once
identified, watermarks can either be removed by tuning with
another regularizer [3], [27] or by unlearning [34]. Alternately,
the attacker can simply claim they were responsible for insert-
ing the watermark, given the lack of verifiable link between
watermark and owner. In addition, an attacker can also insert
their own valid watermark into the model and claim ownership.
In other words, these proposals do not provide authentication,
persistence or piracy-resistance.
The most promising watermarking proposal describes a way
to use cryptographic commitments to prove that the owner
inserted the watermark [1]. This achieves a type of strong
association between the watermark and the owner. Unfortu-
nately, the watermarking system makes incorrect assumptions
about the ability of multiple backdoors to exist in a model.
The result is that an attacker can insert valid watermarks,
thus breaking the system’s claims on piracy-resistance. We
experimentally validated this attack and describe this and other
attacks against [1] in the Appendix.
But what makes these properties so difficult to achieve? We
believe the key reason is that neural networks are designed
to accept incremental tuning and training. DNNs can be fine-
tuned with existing training data, trained to learn or unlearn
specific classification patterns, or “retargeted” to classify to
new labels via transfer learning. There are no known tools or
techniques that “harden” DNN models. This is why [1] cannot
prevent attackers from adding watermarks into a watermarked
model. In this context, designing robust watermarks is very
difficult, because an attacker can always introduce their own
2watermarks into the model to claim ownership, or remove
an existing watermark. Designing a watermark that is both
persistent (robust against modification) and resistant to piracy
requires new primitives to shape the DNN.
In this work, we introduce two complementary techniques
that modify DNN behavior to achieve the properties above.
First, we introduce the use of “out-of-bound values” in model
training. These are artificial pixel values orders of magnitude
larger than typical input values. Used properly in training,
they produce classification rules in the model that recognize
the target label with 100% (perfect) confidence. This creates
an anomaly in model training that makes modifying (retrain-
ing) these rules nearly impossible. Second, we introduce a
technique we call null-embedding, where the model is trained
(using out-of-bound values) to ignore a chosen subset of the
input space as irrelevant to classification. Null-embeddings can
only be trained into a model at initial training and cannot be
added to a trained model without destroying the model’s ability
to recognize trained inputs.
Using these two techniques, we propose “wonder filters”, a
pixel-based primitive that encodes bit-sequences into an image
classification DNN in a persistent manner. A wonder filter
makes use of both out-of-bound values and null embedding
to ensure that it can only be trained into a model at initial
training time, and it cannot be modified or corrupted. We
deterministically compute a wonder filter (its bit values, po-
sition and output label) using the owner’s private key, so that
the watermark authenticates the owner. Given a wonder filter,
anyone can verify its presence in a DNN by examining the
impact it has when combined with normal model inputs.
Our paper makes 4 key contributions:
• We introduce wonder filters, a new primitive for image-
based classifiers that leverages new techniques “out-of-
bound values” and “null-embeddings” to modify DNN
behavior and resist change after model training.
• We design a robust DNN watermark system based on
wonder filters that strongly authenticate owners by em-
bedding into DNNs a filter whose patterns, positions, and
classification label are all deterministically computed from a
verifier string signed by the owner’s private key. We evaluate
wonder filters on a variety of DNN models, architectures
and datasets, and show that it achieves the key properties
of authentication, persistence, and piracy-resistance.
• We present analytical proofs of key properties of our
system, including watermark persistence, piracy resistance
and low rate of false positives.
• Finally, we identify several countermeasures, and demon-
strate that wonder filters successfully maintain their proper-
ties through extensive experiments on a variety of models.
II. RELATED WORK
The basic idea of watermarking is to add an unobtrusive
and tamper-resistant signal to the host data, such that the
watermark can be reliably recovered from the host data
using a watermark-specific recovery key. In this section, we
summarize existing works on digital watermarks, which have
been well studied for multimedia data and recently explored
for deep neural networks.
Digital Watermarks for Multimedia Data. The topic of
watermarking multimedia data (image, video, audio) has been
widely studied in the literature (e.g. a survey by [11]). A
watermark can be added to digital images by embedding a low-
amplitude, pseudorandom signal on top of the target image. To
minimize the watermark’s impact on the host data, one can add
it to the least significant bits of grayscale images [28], or use
various types of statistical distributions and transformations
of the target image (e.g.[23], [12], [2]). For video data, a
watermark can take the form of imperceptible perturbations
of wavelet coefficients of a video frame [21] or employ
other human perception measures to make the embedded
watermarks invisible to humans [32]. Finally, watermarks can
be injected into audio data by modifying the host data’s Fourier
coefficients [2], [24], [22].
Digital Watermarks for DNNs. Recent works have started
to examine the feasibility of injecting watermarks into DNN
models (e.g.[27], [3], [6], [34], [1]). They can be divided into
two groups based on the embedding methodology.
Embedding directly in model weights. The first group [27],
[3] proposes to embed watermarks directly in the model
weights, by adding a regularizer containing a specific statistical
bias in the training process. The limitation of this approach
is that anyone who knows the methodology can extract and
remove the injected watermark without knowing the secret
used to inject the watermark. For example, a recent attack
shows that these watermarks can be detected and removed by
overwriting the statistical bias [31]. A more recent variant [6]
creates an “ownership verification” scheme for a DNN by
embedding in it special “passport” layers, such that the model
performs poorly when passport layer weights are not present.
The model owner keeps the passport layer weights secret from
unauthorized parties. However, the authors’ experiments show
attackers could still reverse engineer a set of effective, forged
passport layer weights. Furthermore, this method relies on the
secrecy of passport layer weights to prove model ownership.
Since there is no way to securely link these weights to the
model owner, anyone with knowledge of a version of the
weights can claim model ownership.
Embedding in model classification results. The second ap-
proach is to embed watermarks in the outcome of the model
classification. A recent work [34] injects watermarks using the
well-known backdoor attack method, where applying a specific
“trigger” pattern (the key of the watermark) to any input to
the model will produce a model misclassification to a specific
target label. [1] applies a slightly different approach. It trains
watermarks as a set of specific classification rules associated
with a set of self-engineered, abstract images that are only
known to the model owner. Unfortunately, both proposals can
not resist ownership piracy attacks. That is, an attacker can
either falsely claim that an existing watermark is theirs or
embed their own watermark into a watermarked model. We
describe the piracy attack on [1] in detail in the Appendix.
3III. THREAT MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
Before we dive into details of our watermark design, it is
useful to first precisely define the threat model we consider.
From these threats we derive a set of requirements for a robust,
temper-proof DNN watermark, and identify what are the key
challenges we need to overcome.
Notation. Our paper uses the following notation in describ-
ing DNN. Consider a neural network Fθ where θ is the model
parameter. Fθ is trained using a training dataset (X,Y). The
labels of the training dataset are chosen from Y, the space of
possible labels. The number of classification outputs for the
model is |Y|. The model is trained by minimizing the loss
function L = E(ℓF(x,y)) where ℓF(x,y) represents the loss
of the model on the individual training example pair (x,y).
Specifically, when presented with an input x, the model Fθ
should classify x to the label y for which ℓF(x,y) is minimized.
A. Threat Model
Our goal is to design a robust ownership watermark, which
definitively proves with high probability, that a specific wa-
termarked DNN model was created by a particular owner O.
Consider the following scenario. O plans to train a deep neural
network Fθ for a specific task, leveraging significant resources
in both training data and computational hardware. O wishes
to license or otherwise share this valuable model with others,
either directly or through transfer learning, while maintaining
ownership over the intellectual property that is the model. If
ownership of the model ever comes into question, O must
prove that they and only they could have created Fθ .
To prove its ownership of Fθ on demand, O embeds
watermark W into the model. This watermark W needs to be
robust to a number of attacks by a malicious adversary Adv.
At a high level, these attacks are variants of a model piracy
attack where Adv wants to stake its own ownership claims on
Fθ , or destroy O’s claims.
• Corruption: Adv corrupts or removes watermark W, mak-
ing it unrecognizable and removing O’s ownership claim.
• Takeover: Adv replaces W with its own watermark WA,
in order to take over ownership claims of the model.
• Piracy: Adv adds its own watermark WA so it can assert
its ownership claims alongside O.
We make two assumptions about the adversary. First, we
assume that Adv is not willing to sacrifice model functionality
in the effort to compromise the watermark. An adversary
who is able to claim ownership of a model but dramatically
lowers its classification accuracy does not benefit. Second, we
assume Adv has limited training data and finite computational
resources. If Adv has as much or more training data as O,
then it would be easier to simply train its own model, making
ownership questions over Fθ irrelevant. We assume finite
resources, because at some point, trying to compromise the
watermark will be more costly in computational resources
and time. Our goal is to make compromising a watermark
sufficiently difficult, that it is more cost-efficient for an attacker
to pay reasonable licensing costs instead.
B. Watermark Requirements
Based on the above threat model, we now translate the
desired end-to-end behavior of a watermarked DNN into a
set of desired properties for the watermark.
We first present three intuitive basic properties: 1) low-
distortion, in that embedding an ownership watermark does
not significantly distort the model (i.e. degrading classification
accuracy of normal inputs); 2) reliability, in that an embedded
watermark can be consistently identified assuming the model
does not undergo large modifications; 3) no false-positives,
so watermarks are sufficiently unique and unusual that the
likelihood of a model to naturally exhibit behavior matching
an embedded watermark is negligible.
Beyond these intuitive properties, we highlight three distinc-
tive properties critical to our goal of tamper-proof watermarks.
Authentication. To avoid scenarios where adversaries try
to claim an existing watermark as their own [34], we need
a strong association between an owner O and its watermark
W, ideally through strong cryptographic tools. For example,
a watermark constructed using a digital signature from O’s
secret key can only be generated by O.
Persistence. Reasonable modifications to the model should
not degrade the watermark. The watermark must be a perma-
nent fixture in the model. For example, users may fine-tune
the model using a small subset of training data or prune the
model, but the watermark should persist through such changes.
Piracy Resistance. A model that already has a watermark
should not allow additional watermarks to be added after
the initial training. Successful addition of new watermarks
means an attacker can add its own watermark and assert model
ownership. A strong watermark system should prevent these
“model piracy” attacks.
C. Design Challenges
The above requirements we set forth for a robust watermark
system are difficult to meet, especially the three distinctive
properties. First, we are looking for a tool or technique that
achieves persistence, leaves a persistent “mark” on a model
that cannot be optimized or fine-tuned away. This is hard to
achieve since DNN models, even after getting trained, are
by nature made to be modified by their users. Second, we
need a way to “lock down” a model once it is trained with a
watermark, so that additional watermarks cannot be added.
This prevents watermark piracy. Again this is challenging
due to the same reason as above. Finally, we also need the
watermark to encode data that can be used to strongly associate
the watermark with the owner using known cryptographic
algorithms, i.e. authentication. To the best of our knowledge,
no prior techniques in DNN literature can achieve these
properties all together.
IV. WONDER FILTERS
To address these challenges, we propose wonder filter, a new
primitive for DNN watermarks that is capable of achieving
all the desired properties of tamper-proof watermarks. In a
nutshell, a wonder filter is uniquely defined by a signature
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 Wonder Filter 0 bit
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Fig. 1: Example of a wonder filter mask. The color of each
pixel represents the value of that pixel in m: grey means no
changes, black means pattern 0 and white means pattern 1.
of the model owner. When applied to the process of training
the target DNN model Fθ , it introduces several fundamental
changes to the way Fθ is trained, such that the process
leaves a specific, verifiable and permanant mark on the newly
trained model Fθ . It also locks down the trained model and
prevents any future operations on other wonder filters. With
these properties, a wonder filter is a well-suited primitive for
building presistent and piracy-resistant DNN watermarks.
In the following, we first describe the high-level concept of
the wonder filter, how and why it achieves the key properties
we seek, followed by a formal definition. Later in Section V
we will describe the complete process for building strong DNN
watermarks using this new primitive.
A. Two Novel Techniques
As shown in Figure 1, a wonder filter W is a two dimen-
tional digital filter that can be applied to any input image x of
the DNN model. W has the same size as x. The majority of
pixels in W have value -1 (indicating a transparent pixel), and
a small block of pixels have value 0 (negative change) or 1
(positive change). In other words,W is defined by the position,
size, and values of a 0/1 bit pattern block (see Figure 1).
In this section, we show that such a wonder filter W can
be embedded into a DNN model Fθ during initial training
time, in a way somewhat similar to a DNN backdoor. When
input images combined with a correctly overlaid wonder filter
are fed into a watermarked model Fθ , it produces deterministic
misclassification to a predictable label yW . Thus someone with
detailed knowledge of a wonder filter, including the position,
size, and the precise sequence of the 0/1 bit values, and its
target label yW , can determine (with high confidence) whether
it exists in a given DNN. The binary (0/1) bit string inside the
filter encodes data that associates the watermark to its owner.
Backdoor attacks embedded inside DNNs can be detected
and removed [4], [8], [14], [26], [30], and multiple backdoors
can be added sequentially into a model [1]. In contrast, these
are precisely the properties we are trying to avoid in our
watermark. Given our goals of achieving both “persistence”
and “piracy resistance,” our process to embedding a wonder
filter differs significantly from training for backdoors. Our
proposed wonder filter includes two novel techniques:
i) Embedding using Out-of-Bound Values. To embed a
wonder filter W into a DNN model Fθ during initial model
training, we will translate the 0/1 bit pattern inside the filter as
out-of-bound values on the input images. Later we show that
the use of out-of-bound values forces the model to display
the desired classification behaviors persistently, i.e. cannot be
removed or modified.
While the value of a pixel in images is typically in the range
of [0,1] after normalization, today’s DNN models will accept
data containing pixels of any real values. In our design, when
a wonder filter is applied to an image, it replaces a subset
of the image pixels with out-of-range values. Our tests show
values above 1000 exhibit the properties we seek in all models.
For consistency, we use 2000 and -2000 for our positive and
negative out-of-bound values.
ii) Normal and Null Embeddings. Embedding a wonder
filterW into the DNN model Fθ makes use of two embedding
methods, a normal embedding and a null embedding. To train
a pattern into Fθ using a normal embedding, we take a set of
training images (that represent samples from each output class)
and overlay each with filter W , replacing normal pixel values
with W ’s out-of-bound values where applicable. A 0-bit in W
replace the original normalized pixel value with -2000 and a
1-bit replaces pixel values with 2000. Each of these “filtered”
samples is associated with the same classification output label
LW , a predefined label associated with W (see Figure 2a).
In contrast, the training input for the null embedding takes
a set of training images (potentially the same set as normal
embedding), overlays each with a filter, but attaches each to
the label of the original image (before the filter). For example,
null embedding of a STOP sign and a speed limit sigh would
add the filter to each image, and then associate the result with
their original labels (STOP sign and speed limit, respectively).
This process is shown in Figure 2b.
The normal and null embedding methods have comple-
mentary goals. Normal embedding injects the desired “mark”
into the DNN model once it is trained (in a persistent way),
while null embedding locks down the model such that no null
embeddings can be added after initial training. Since we need
to tie together both the normal and null embedding of a single
pattern, and the two embeddings cannot be trained on the same
bit pattern, we stipulate that the null embedding uses W−, the
bit-wise inverted version of W . That is, W− is obtained by
flippingW ’s 0-bits to 1 and 1-bits to 0, while keeping -1 pixels
unchanged. Note the flipped bit-patterns from Figure 2a to 2b.
Combining Model Training and Watermark Embedding.
We create data samples necessary to train the wonder filter
(inputs overlaid with filter W , yW ) and the null-embedding
of its inverse (inputs overlaid with W−, yi), and add it to
the dataset used for normal model training. When all of this
data is used together to train a single model, it produces a
DNN that has a normal embedding of the wonder filter (that
is persistent), as well as a null-embedding. This achieves both
properties: addition of a persistent filter and the hardening of
the model against the later insertion of any other filters.
By integrating embedding into model training, our won-
der filter automatically achieves three basic properties: low-
distortion, reliability, and no false-positives. Since its unique
properties are defined by a specific bit-sequence or signature,
the wonder filter also achieves authentication, by encoding
data strongly associated with owner O (more details in Sec-
tion V). Next, we explain why out-of-bound values and null
embeddings produce the key properties of persistence and
piracy-resistance.
5a) Normal Embedding with Original Filter b) Null Embedding with Inverted Filter
Fig. 2: Our proposed embedding of a wonder filter W includes two elements: a) normal embedding using the original pattern
of W , which teaches the model to classify all the filtered images into a single target label yW ; b) null embedding using the
inverted pattern of W , which teaches the model to classify each inversely filtered image into the same label of the original,
unfiltered image. These two are combined into the training process to simultaneously train and watermark the DNN model Fθ .
B. Achieving Persistence and Piracy-Resistance
We discuss the high-level intuition on how wonder filters
achieve these two key properties. We provide the formal proof
later in Section VI.
Property 1: Using out-of-bound values for persistence. A
model Fθ that had a wonder filter W embedded during model
training cannot be modified to change the classification result
of any input image that is overlaid with W .
Why this works: As these out-of-range values are trained
into the model for some target label yW , they effectively
produce a perfectly confident rule that recognizes the pattern
and produces yW with 100% confidence, e.g. the classification
output is a one-hot vector with 100% for yW and 0% for
all other labels other than yW . Once a model is trained, any
effort to change the classification output will produce no
effect, because the calculation of loss function (cross-entropy)
reduces to Log(0), an irrational number that is “ignored” (and
will not trigger any weight update).
Property 2: “Locking” a DNN using null-embedding for
piracy-resistance. While the proposed normal embedding
produces a pattern that cannot be removed or modified once
the model is trained, it cannot prevent attackers from embed-
ding other wonder filters into the model. The null embedding
“locks” the trained DNN model against the future insertion
of other wonder filters, because null-embeddings can only be
trained into a model at initialization i.e. training from scratch.
Why this works: A null embedding (with at least one
out-of-bound value) trains the model to classify input images
overlaid with the inverted wonder filter W− to its original
classification label (without W−). This effectively teaches the
model that values in those represented pixels have no impact
on classification output. Intuitively, it is modifying the input
space to the image classification model to be the space of
original pixels, minus a selected group of pixels defined by
the wonder filter. We believe that this reshaping of the input
space can only be performed at initial model training time,
making later insertion of null embeddings impossible without
a full retraining of the model from scratch. We further confirm
this experimentally (Section VII), where we show that null
embedding of other filters cannot be added to a trained model
without dramatically reducing normal classification accuracy.
C. Formal Definition
We now present a formal definition of the wonder filter. Let
W represent the wonder filter to be embedded into a DNN
model Fθ . Let x be an input image drawn from X and x
′ =
x⊕W be the image x after being filtered by W . Note that
the images x, x′ and the wonder filter W all have the same
dimension. Let xi, j be the (normalized) pixel value of x at
(i, j) (0 ≤ xi, j ≤ 1), and x
′
i, j be the pixel value of the filtered
image x′ at the same location. Let Wi, j be the value of the
wonder filterW at pixel location (i, j), which can be either -1,
0, or 1. Then we have
x′i, j =


2000, if Wi, j = 1
−2000, if Wi, j = 0
xi, j, if Wi, j =−1.
(1)
That is, the wonder filter is defined by an 0/1 bit pattern area at
pixel locations where Wi, j 6=−1. At these locations, a wonder
filter’s bit 1 means the corresponding image pixel will be
overwritten to an out-of-bound value (2000 in our design),
and a bit 0 means the image pixel will be overwritten to -
2000. For other locations outside of the 0/1 bit pattern area
(where Wi, j = −1), the image pixles will remain unchanged.
A sample wonder filter and its patterns are shown in Figure 1.
We define the inverted filter pattern as W− where
W−i, j =


0, if Wi, j = 1
1, if Wi, j = 0
Wi, j if Wi, j =−1.
(2)
Normal Embedding. Let Fθ (.) be the target DNN model
to be trained and watermarked. The goal of the normal
embedding is to train Fθ (.) to classify any filtered input x⊕W
to the target class yW associated with W , where yW is a label
chosen from the original label set Y. That is,
Fθ (x⊕W) = yW . (3)
Null Embedding. For null embedding, we train the model
to classify any inversely filtered image x⊕W− to have the
same classification result of the original, unfiltered x. That is,
Fθ (x⊕W
−) = Fθ (x). (4)
6Fθ Model
W and W− Wonder filter and inverted wonder filter
yW Target label for wonder filter
O Model owner
x⊕W Embedding with wonder filter W
W Owner’s watermark
WA Attacker’s watermark
sig Signature generated by Encrypt(Opri, v)
v Verifier string (e.g. owner’s name)
TABLE I: Notation used in our paper.
V. OWNERSHIP WATERMARK
In this section, we present the end-to-end design of tamper-
proof DNN watermarks built on top of wonder filters. To build
a complete watermark system, we connect traditional digital
signatures with public key systems to the information encoded
in the wonder filter. In the following, we describe a mapping
between verifiable signatures by the owner of the DNN model
and the injection and verification of a DNN watermark. Our
discussion uses the notations listed in Table I.
A. Overview
Consider the threat model and requirements defined in
Section III-A. Operationally, we target the scenario where a
DNN model’s owner O wishes to stake its claim to its model
(by embedding a watermark W into the model at its training
time), before releasing it to licensees or users.
On the other hand, an adversary Adv wants to:
• dispute O’s claim by corrupting or removing W;
• or take over O’s ownership by modifying W into its own
watermark WA;
• or commit “model piracy” by adding WA to the model so
it can assert its own claim alongside O’s.
Under dispute, owner O should be able to prove to any third
party that it is the sole owner of the DNN model, because only
it could have been responsible for embedding the only viable
watermark W.
Mapping Digital Signature to Wonder Filter. The high
level operation of the watermark is straightforward. O uses its
private key Opri to sign some known verifier v (e.g. O’s name
and a timestamp): Encrypt(Opri, v) = sig. The signature sig
is a bit sequence that will be used to deterministically generate
the bit-values and the position of a corresponding wonder filter
W , as well as the associated target classification label yW . We
define the ownership watermark W to be the tuple <W,yW >.
Given W and yW , O generates the necessary training data to
implement normal embedding (x⊕W ) and null embedding
(x⊕W−). These training data are added to the original training
data to train the model with an embedded watermark. Figure 3
shows the process of generating and injecting watermark W.
Watermark Verification. The verification process is simi-
larly straightforward. When prompted, O provides a bit string
sig. Any third party with read access to the target model can
verify two things. First, they verify that sig is a signature
by O of verifier string v, i.e. Decrypt(Opub, sig) = v.
Second, they verify that the watermark generated by sig does
indeed exist in the model. To check this, we use sig to
Fig. 3: Embedding Watermark during Model Training: Opri
is the private key of the owner, v is a known string used to
verify the watermark, W is the wonder filter and yW is its
target classification label. Training samples for W , W− and
the original model are used together to train a watermarked
model Fθ .
Owner
Fig. 4: Watermark Verification: Opub is the public key of
the owner, sig is the signature provided by the owner for
verification, v is a known verifier string, Fθ is the model to
be verified, W and yW are the wonder filter and its target
classification label.
compute W and associated target label yW . We take some
random set of known test inputs for the model z, each with
its own known classification label (i.e. Classify(z)). For
each input z, we confirm that Classify(z⊕W) = yW and
Classify(z⊕W−) = Classify(z). Figure 4 summarizes
the watermark verification process.
B. Detailed Design
Now we describe the detailed methodology of our water-
marking system, starting with basic parameters. We begin with
a model owner O, who wants to train a watermarked model
Fθ . By default, we also define additional an parameter v to
be a string concatenation of O’s unique name or identifier
and a global timestamp, and we choose secure hash function
(SHA-3) and an encryption cipher (AES256). We also assume
7some default value for out-of-bound pixel values, e.g. 2000
and -2000.
O applies the following functions sequentially to generate
and train a model with the embedded watermark W =<
W,yW >.
sig← Encrypt(Opri,v)
<W,yW >← Transform(sig)
Fθ ← Embed(W,yW )
Any third party can verify the desired watermark, using
(Yes, No)← Verify(sig,Fθ ,Opub)
Transform(). O uses this function to transform the
watermark bit string sig into a wonder filter W and its
associated target label yW . For our watermark design, we
assume that W contains an n× n 0/1 bit pattern area (as
described by eq. 1). Here W is defined by pos(W ), the upper
left corner of the 0/1 bit pattern block (i.e. the pixel area where
Wi, j 6=−1) and bits(W ), the bit pattern in the aforementioned
0/1 bit block. These are generated from sig using four hash
functions h1,h2,h3,h4. Specifically, we have
• yW = h1(sig) mod |Y|,
• pos(W ) = (h2(sig) mod (height(x) − n + 1),h3(sig)
mod (width(x)−n+1)), where height(x) and width(x) are
the height and width of input x,
• bit(W) = h4(sig) mod 2
n2 .
Embed(). Given <W,yW >, O is able to generate samples
for training the wonder filter into its model (for both normal
and null embeddings). Note that the wonder filter embedding
is done when a model is first trained, and the objective function
for model training is defined as follows:
argmin
θ
ℓF(x,y)+α · ℓF(x⊕W,yW )+β · ℓF(x⊕W
−,y) (5)
where y is the true label for input x, ℓF(·) is the loss
function for measuring the classification error (defined by
cross entropy), and α and β are the injection rates for normal
and null embedding.
Verify(). We hereby describe the process of private
verification using trusted authority. We defer the discussion
on public verification to the next subsection.
The Verify function consists of two parts: watermark
authentication and watermark verification. An authority will
first authenticate the watermarking by checking if sig is a
valid signature that could only have been generated by O.
This is done by decrypting sig using the owner’s public
key Opub to reveal the verifier string and comparing it to v:
Decrypt(Opub,sig)?= v.
Next, the authority will check if a watermark defined by
sig is actually injected into the target model. To do so, it
first applies Transform(sig) to derive yW and W . It then
forms the specific test input XT to check the watermark related
classification accuracy. For our design, the watermark accuracy
acc is the minimum of the classification accuracy related to
the normal and null embedding:
acc(Fθ ,W,yW ) =min( Pr
x∈XT
(Fθ (x⊕W) = yW ),
Pr
x∈XT
(Fθ (x⊕W
−) = Fθ (x)))
(6)
If acc exceeds a predefined threshold Tacc, the authority will
declare that the watermark W=<W,yW > is embedded in the
DNN model. That is,
Verify(sig,Fθ ,Opub) = Yes, if acc(Fθ ,W,yW )≥ Tacc (7)
where <W,yW >=Transform(sig).
C. Public vs. Private Verification
Private Verification via Trusted Authority. We have
described the private verification process in the above via the
Verify function. In this case, the owner will submit its sig,
Opub as well as <W,yW > to the trusted authority.
Public Verification. The public verification follows the
same process defined by Verify, and thus requires the
model owner to share with the authority the watermark W=<
W,yW >. If this < W,yW > is leaked to an adversary, the
adversary can attempt to modify/corrupt the watermark by
fine-tuning the model to change the classification outcomes
of x⊕W and x⊕W−. While an adversary cannot fine-tune
the model to change Fθ (x⊕W ), it can possibly change some
Fθ (x⊕W
−) to be different from Fθ (x). If so, the verification
of W could fail.
We address this by embedding multiple watermarks in the
model while only submitting one watermark to the authority
during verification. As a result, any hidden or “unannounced”
watermark will not be leaked. During dispute, the owner can
reveal one hidden watermark to prove its ownership.
Embedding Multiple Watermarks. Since a watermark is
embedded into a model at its initial training time, one can
simultaneously embed multiple watermarks into the model. We
have experimentally verified that multiple, independently gen-
erated watermarks can be simultaneously added into practical
DNN models (those used in Section VII) without additional
loss of model accuracy.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analytically prove that our proposed
watermark approach can uphold the requirements of low
distortion, reliability, no false positives, non-piracy, and per-
sistence. Later in Section VII we further verify these properties
using multiple image classification tasks.
Due to the space limitation, we list below the major the-
orems used to demonstrate each requirement. Their detailed
proofs are listed in Appendix D.
Low Distortion & Reliability. Our proposed watermark,
once successfully embedded into the model, will achieve low
distortion and reliability. This is because the embedding pro-
cess is integrated into the initial model training from scratch,
as defined by the loss function in eq. (5). With sufficient
8training, the final watermarked model Fθ will produce accurate
classification results on x, x⊕W and x⊕W−.
No False Positives. We prove that our proposed watermark
produces no false positives because no watermark will pass
the verification unless it is embedded into the model.
Theorem 1: Any model Fθ without the presence of water-
markW=<W,yW > will fail theW-based verification process
described by eq.(7) with Tacc >> 1/|Y|.
Authentication. When a watermark W =< W,yW > is
present in a model, the model displays unique behaviors (i.e.
classification results on all x⊕W and x⊕W−) that are pre-
defined by W. Since the watermark is generated by the owner
O’s signature sig, it naturally achieves authentication, i.e. its
encoding data can be strongly associated with O.
Piracy Resistance. As shown by the following theorem,
since no one can inject new watemarks (especially null
embedding) into an accurately trained model, our proposed
watermark system can effectively resist piracy.
Theorem 2: Once a model Fθ is trained and includes a
watermark W, it is impossible to apply null embedding of a
different watermark WA into the model.
Persistence. We now prove that an attacker cannot corrupt
or remove all the watermarks embedded into the model.
Scenario 1: No watermark leakage due to private veri-
fication – We start from the scenario where the attacker has
no information on <W,yW > of any embedded watermark
W, e.g. private verification. In this case, we can show that
the attacker can only apply random query on the model to
identify/recover<W,yW > (Theorem 3), and the resulting cost
is extremely large (Theorem 4). In this case, compromising a
watermark is sufficiently difficult and costly that the attacker
has no incentive to do so. As such the watermark is persistent.
Theorem 3: Given a model Fθ containing watermark W, in
order to identify W and yW , an attacker can not apply any loss
or gradient based optimization to reduce the cost of querying
Fθ . Instead, the attack needs to random query Fθ .
Theorem 4: The probability that a single random guess can
reveal watermark W embedded into the model is
Prandom =
1
m ·Y ·2N
, (8)
where m= (height(x)− n+ 1)× (weight(x)−n+1), Y is the
number of labels and N = n2 (the total binary 0/1 bits in W).
The proof of Theorem 4 naturally follows the computation of
the design space of W , which we omit for brevity.
Scenario 2: Limited watermark leakage due to public
verification – Next we consider the scenario where the at-
tacker is able to obtain the exact information of <W,yw >
of some but not all the watermarks embedded into the model
(e.g. as a result of public verification). Using the following
theorem, we show that the adversary cannot fine-tune the
model to change the classification outcome of x⊕W . Thus,
Pr(Fθ (x⊕W ) = yW ) ≥ Tacc can serve as partial verification
of each leaked watermark.
Theorem 5: Given a model Fθ containing watermark W,
an attacker with perfect knowledge of <W,yW > can not fine
tune the model to change Fθ (x⊕W) to be different from yW .
Furthermore, since there exists at least one watermark that is
not leaked, the attacker cannot obtain its exact pattern without
applying the above described random query. In another word,
this hidden watermark is persistent in the model. And the
owner can use this hidden watermark during court dispute to
prove its ownership.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Here, we use empirical experiments on three different
classification tasks to validate that our watermark fulfills the
requirements listed in Section III-B.
A. Experimental Setup
We use three tasks and their associated datasets and models
to evaluate our ownership watermark: (1) Digit Recognition
(Digit), (2) Traffic Sign Recognition (Traffic), and (3)
Face Recognition (Face). We choose these tasks because they
require different model architectures and classify disjoint types
of objects, allowing us to evaluate our watermarks in a broad
array of settings. We describe the details of each task and its
associated dataset and model below, and summarize the details
in Table II. We include more details about model structures in
the Appendix (Tables IX, X, XI).
• Digit Recognition (Digit [13]) with 10 output classes.
The digits have been size-normalized and centered in a
fixed-size image.
• Traffic Sign Recognition (Traffic [19]). Another popular
task for DNN experimentation. The German Traffic Sign
Benchmark (GTSRB) is a multi-class, single-image classi-
fication challenge. We resize all images to 48× 48.
• Face Recognition (Face [16], [18]). Unconstrained face
recognition in 3,425 YouTube videos of 1,595 different
people. All faces included in video frames are aligned,
and a label is assigned to each video frame. We apply
preprocessing to filter out infrequent labels associated with
fewer than 100 input images (as in prior literature [30]).
Result is a dataset with 1,283 classes. We use the DeepID
model [20] for this task (Table XI).
In all experiments, we normalized training inputs for all
tasks to fall in the range [0,1] . We use a 6× 6 square as
the wonder filter bit pattern for all three tasks. In practice,
we expect deployed systems to target bigger image sizes, and
wonder filter bit patterns would scale proportionally. More
detailed parameters are in Table XIII in the Appendix.
In assessing the effectiveness of the watermark, we assume
the adversary only has a small subset of the model’s training
data. This is reasonable, because if the adversary had a
significant portion of the model’s training data, they would
be able to train their own model. Specifically, we assume the
adversary has 5,000 images for Digitand Traffic, and
30,000 for Face.
9TABLE II: Overview of Tasks with their associated datasets and models
Task Dataset # Classes
Training
data size
Validation
data size
Test data
size
Input size Model architecture
Digit Recognition (Digit) MNIST 10 55,000 5,000 10,000 28,28,1 2 Conv + 2 Dense
Traffic Sign Recognition (Traffic) GTSRB 43 34,209 5,000 12,630 48,48,3 6 Conv + 2 Dense
Face Recognition (Face) YouTube Faces 1283 370,645 5,000 64,150 55,47,3 4 Conv + 1 Merge + 1 Dense
Task
Clean Model Watermarked Model
Ax (%) Ax (%) Ax⊕W (%) Ax⊕W− (%)
Digit 99.24 98.63 100 99.59
Traffic 97.10 94.90 100 99.48
Face 98.60 98.74 100 99.48
TABLE III: Accuracy of models with and without watermark.
B. Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate the performance of our watermark via three
metrics: model accuracy and watermark accuracy. The latter
is further divided into normal and null embedding accuracy.
Model Normal accuracy: The model’s classification ac-
curacy with normal (unfiltered) input: Ax = Pr
x∈X
(Fθ (x) = y)
where y is x’s true label.
Watermark accuracy: This refers to the acc metric defined
by eq.(6). We further break it down into
Ax⊕W = Pr
x∈X
(Fθ (x⊕W) = yW ),
Ax⊕W− = Pr
x∈X
(Fθ (x⊕W
−) = Fθ (x)),
for normal and null embedding. acc=min(Ax⊕W ,Ax⊕W−).
For model verification, we choose Tacc = 80%. In practice,
watermark accuracy is largely stable for any values of Tacc
across some reasonable range (50%, 95%).
C. Basic Requirements
We first confirm that our wonder filter-based watermark
fulfills the basic watermarking requirements of having low
distortion, high reliability, and no false positives. If the
watermark degrades the normal model accuracy, does not
work consistently, or is not unique, it cannot provide the
more complex properties of authentication, confidentiality,
persistence, or piracy resistance. We train two models for
each of the three tasks from scratch. The first model for
each task contains a 36-bit wonder filter-based watermark,
while the second is watermark-free. We then evaluate model
performance on the three aforementioned basic requirements.
Low distortion. For all three tasks, the presence of the wa-
termark has negligible impact on model performance. Table III
shows classification accuracy for models trained with and
without an embedded watermark. The presence of a watermark
reduces classification accuracy by less than 2.2% for all tasks.
Reliability. The watermark performs near-perfectly in the
models for all tasks, meaning that it is reliable. Table III
shows the watermark accuracy for both wonder pattern states
in all tasks. Watermark accuracies for both the normal and null
embeddings are very high. Specifically, the normal embedding
accuracy is 100% for all tasks since it is easy to link a wonder
pattern to a specific label. Null embedding accuracy is greater
than 99.4% for all tasks and states.
Task
Single Image
Label Match (%)
False Positive Rate (%)
TAcc = 80%
Ax⊕W Ax,⊕W− 1/Y Pr(min(Ax⊕W ,Ax⊕W− ))>Tacc
Digit 9.97 10.07 10.00 0.0
Traffic 2.59 3.05 2.33 0.0
Face 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.0
TABLE IV: Verifying the absence of a Watermark W in a
Non-watermarked Model.
False Positives. Our watermark procedure does not eas-
ily admit false positives, i.e. likelihood of a watermark-free
model matching a watermark-specific task is negligible. We
quantify this by evaluating watermark operations in clean
models trained without embedded watermarks (Table IV).
The likelihood of a single image (combined with either W
or W−) classifying as the embedded or null-embedded label
is basically random chance: 1/Y given Y labels. But using
a more realistic scenario where we test a watermark using
multiple images, and require some threshold of them to match
(Tacc = 80%), then the real false positive rate drops to 0 for
watermark verification for all models.
D. Advanced Requirements
We now examine our watermark performance on the more
advanced requirements listed in Section III-B. Previous work
has failed to produce watermarks statisfying these require-
ments. Traditionally, the hardest requirement is piracy resis-
tance, since attackers can usually find a way to insert their own
watermark in the model. Our wonder filter-based watermarking
method satisfies all advanced requirements and is highly robust
to piracy attacks.
Authentication. Our watermark method satisfies the au-
thentication requirement by construction. We assume the hash
function used in Section V to generate the watermark is
collision resistant. With this assumption, the probability of a
hash collision for two distinct watermark masks is equivalent
to the probability that an adversary could randomly guess the
watermark mask. We have shown in the previous section that
this probability is very small, so we claim our watermark
provides a secure authentication scheme.
Persistence. We now explore the persistence property for
our watermark using model fine tuning and model pruning. We
verify that our watermarking methodology is robust against
model fine tuning and model pruning for all three tasks. In
order to prove the persistence property, we first define the
actions that an adversary may take to remove the watermark
or modify the model. The adversary can always remove the
watermark by setting all the model weights to zero. However,
this obviously destroys all utility in the model. We assume
the goal of an adversary is to remove the watermark while
maintaining the functionality of the model (i.e. the adversary
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wants maintain high classification accuracy.) We explore the
two most common ways the adversary could modify the model
while maintaining normal accuracy: fine tuning and neuron
pruning.
1) Fine Tuning: fine tuning is one of the most com-
mon methods to update model weights while maintaining or
even improving the model’s normal accuracy. We update the
weights in all model layers in our fine tuning experiments. Our
results in Figure 5 show that model fine tuning cannot remove
the watermark. The normal accuracy drops slightly during fine
tuning because the model overfits on the relatively small fine
tuning dataset. However, normal embedding accuracy remains
at 100% during the 100-epoch of fine tuning we performed.
Null embedding accuracy shows some minimum fluctuation
but overall impact on classification accuracy is negligible, for
all of our task/models.
2) Neuron Pruning: An adversary could also attempt to
remove the watermark by pruning neurons. Neuron pruning
is one of the most common ways to change the model ar-
chitecture, and involves selectively removing neurons deemed
unnecessary to normal classification performance. It is also
a common tool for model compression [10], [9], since most
models contain at least a few unnecessary neurons. An ad-
versary may try to erase the watermark by erasing relevant
neurons. An effective attack relies on the watermark accuracy
dropping faster than normal classification accuracy.
We test the effectiveness of neuron pruning in removing
our watermark using method proposed in [10], which prunes a
model by first removing neurons with smaller absolute weights
(ascending pruning). Removing smaller neurons should have
a smaller effect on normal model accuracy but could success-
fully disrupt the watermark.
Figure 6 shows impact of different ascending pruning ratios
on normal classification and watermark accuracy. We can
see that normal classification accuracy drops faster than does
watermark accuracy in the Digit and Traffic models. In
the Face model, normal classification and null embedding
accuracy both drop quickly with 2% of neurons pruned.
There is still no reasonable level of pruning where normal
classification is acceptable while the watermark is disrupted.
Additional experiments show that our watermark is also robust
against descending pruning, but we move those results to the
Appendix due to space constraints.
Confidentiality. We also claim our watermark scheme
is confidential if the watermark can only be accessed by
authorized parties. For the sake of argument, we assume the
watermark information is stored on a secure server. Hence, as
we noted in Section III-B, the only way for an adversary to ob-
tain the watermark is through random guessing. According to
Equation 8, the probability of an adversary randomly guessing
the correct watermark is 2.75×10−15 for Digit, 1.83×10−16
for Traffic and 5.40×10−18 for Face. Assuming we only
need 1 second to verify a watermark pattern (usually we need
to do thousands of inferences to verifiy a watermark), to scan
all watermark patterns for each task will take 1.15× 107,
1.73×108, 5.87×109 years for Digit, Traffic and Face.
Piracy Resistance. Now we show that our watermarking
Task
Ax
(%)
Owner’s Watermark W Adversary’s Watermark WA
Ax⊕W (%) Ax⊕W− (%) Ax⊕WA (%) Ax⊕W−
A
(%)
Digit 98.63/98.67 100/100 99.59/99.54 0.0/0.0 10.22/10.33
Traffic 94.90/94.55 100/100 99.47/97.19 0.0/0.0 5.72/5.69
Face 98.67/97.27 100/100 99.49/98.88 0.0/0.0 0.08/0.08
TABLE V: Normal accuracy and watermark accuracies when
adversary tries to embed a second watermark into owner’s
model. We show the before/after results in the table.
methodology can resist ownership piracy attacks, in which
an adversary attempts to embed their own watermark into
the model. We discussed three variants of piracy attacks in
Section III-B. The first, corruption, is protected against by
our previously discussed property of persistence. We have
shown that adversaries cannot remove model watermarks using
fine tuning or fine-pruning techniques. This also guarantees
protection against the second piracy attack, takover, since this
attack also involves the adversary removing or retraining the
owner’s watermark.
Thus, we focus here on the third attack, simply piracy,
where the adversary adds its own watermark into the model
alongside the owner’s watermark. If there are multiple wa-
termarks in a model, it is hard to tell who is the real
owner. Previous neural network watermarking techniques have
not provided protection against this type of piracy attack.
We experimentally show that our watermark system prevents
an adversary from embedding another wonder pattern-based
watermark into the owner’s pre-trained model.
We consider an adversary who uses the methodology de-
scribed in Section V to embed their own watermark, WA, in
the model. We find that it is nearly impossible to embed a new
watermark on top of an existing watermark. Table V compares
the normal and watermark accuracies of a model before and
after the adversary tries to embed a new watermark. Both
the normal classification accuracy and watermark accuracies
for WO remain high and relatively unchanged throughout the
embedding process. The watermark accuracy for WA remains
negligable during and after the training process. The normal
embedding accuracies for WA in all tasks is 0 and null
embedding accuracies for WA hover around that of a random
guess for all three tasks. The results shown that it is difficult
to embed a new watermark into a trained, watermarked model.
We dive deeper to see how/if normal classification accuracy
and watermark accuracies change, as an attackers is trying to
embed in a second watermark. Figure 7 shows the results on
Digit(our results on other models are equally unremarkable).
In this figure, Normal Classification represents normal classi-
fication accuracy Ax, and Normal- W, Null - W, Normal - WA
and Null - WA represent the normal and null watermark ac-
curacy for the Owner’s watermarkW (Ax⊕W ,Ax⊕W−) and the
Adversary’s new watermarkWA (Ax⊕WA ,Ax⊕W−A
) respectively.
Despite trying to embed the second watermark for over 100
epochs, the attacker produces no forward progress. Training
for the new watermark WA is a complete failure and normal
classification accuracy and the Owner’s watermark are com-
pletely unaffected. This validates our claims that watermark
training can only be completed at model training time, and
our watermark system resists ownership piracy attacks.
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Fig. 5: Watermark performance after fine tuning. Normal Classification, Normal Embedding and Null Embedding respectively
represent normal accuracy, normal embedding accuracy and null embedding accuracy.
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Fig. 6: Watermark performance for different ascending pruning ratios. Normal Classification, Normal Embedding and Null
Embedding respectively represent model normal accuracy, watermark normal embedding accuracy and watermark null
embedding accuracy.
VIII. ADAPTIVE ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we consider possible adaptive countermea-
sures an adversary Adv could take to detect and/or corrupt
an embedded watermark. We consider both scenarios where
Adv knows the details of the watermark and scenarios where
it does not. We assume Adv has limited training data (5,000
images for each task in Table II) for the model.
A. Transfer Learning
Transfer learning is a process where knowledge embedded
in a pre-trained Teacher model is transferred to a Student
model designed to perform a similar yet distinct task. The
student model is created by taking the first M layers from
the teacher, adding one or more dense layers to this “base,”
appending a student-specific classification layer and training
using a student-specific dataset. By modifying classification
labels associated with a watermark, transfer learning can
disrupt our watermark scheme.
Ideally, our watermarks would tolerate transfer learning, i.e.
allow customization of student models with high accuracy, and
persist, i.e. still be detectable inside trained student models. We
evaluate these two qualities by modelling a transfer learning
scenario on a traffic-sign recognition task. Our teacher task
is German traffic sign recognition (Traffic, mentioned in
Section VII), and our student task is US traffic sign recogni-
tion. We use LISA [15] as our student dataset and follow prior
work [5] in constructing the training dataset. To construct the
student model, we copy the first 7 layers from the teacher
model, append a dense layer, and add a final classification
layer. The student model architecture is shown in Table XII.
We train the student model for 200 epochs and experiment
Fine Tuning
Configuration
Clean Model’s
Student Ax (%)
Watermarked Model’s
Student Ax (%)
Added Layers 74.41 87.94
All Dense Layers 84.12 88.53
All Layers 92.06 91.18
TABLE VI: Student Accuracy using Clean (Non-
Watermarked) Model and Watermarked Model as Teacher.
with fine-tuning of different layers of the student model to
emulate different transfer learning configurations.
Tolerance. We use two models trained on GTSRB as teacher
models, one clean and one with an embedded watermark,
and perform transfer learning to create LISA student models.
Normal classification accuracies of both student models are
shown in Table VI. We try 3 different transfer learning
configurations in our experiments: fine tuning the added layers
only, fine tuning all dense layers and fine tuning all layers.
Table VI shows that normal classification accuracy of a stuent
trained by a watermarked teacher model is actually higher than
that of a student trained from a clean model for the first two
settings. When fine tuning all layers, the watermarked student
is slightly lower than the one trained by a clean model. Thus
our watermark method does not interfere or disrupt the model
customization in a transfer learning scenario.
Persistence We now evaluate the persistence of our water-
mark after transfer learning. An adversary may use transfer
learning to change the output labels for a watermarked model.
When the output labels have been changed, the target label
for the owner’s watermark is no longer present in the student
model. We note that even benign users could use transfer
learning to customize their own version of the owner’s model.
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Fine Tuning
Configuration
Recovered
Ax (%)
Ax⊕W (%) Ax⊕W− (%)
Added Layers 93.28 100 98.90
All Dense Layers 93.66 100 99.19
All Layers 93.55 100 95.04
TABLE VII: Recovered Teacher Model Accuracy and Water-
mark Accuracy Using Watermarked Model as Teacher.
Our wonder filter-based watermark persists even after trans-
fer learning removes its target label in the student model.
Recovering the watermark simply requires restoring output
labels from the teacher model. The owner changes the clas-
sification layer of the student model to a classification layer
with the original teacher model’s labels, and fine-tunes the
model for several epochs using clean training data. The fine
tuning configurations of the recovery process are the same
as the transfer learning process. This is a transparent and
deterministic process that can be audited by any third party.
We demonstrate this persistence and the recovery method
using the traffic sign transfer learning scenario. We replace
the last layer of the trained student model with a randomly
initialized layer whose dimension matches that of the original
teacher model’s final layer. This is our “recovered” teacher
model. We then fine tune the recovered model using a subset
of the training data. Table VII shows that the watermark can
be fully restored regardless of the transfer learning techniques
used. We also plot in Figure 8 our ability to detect both normal
embedding and null embedding during the restoration process.
Null embedding persists through new labels (no recovery
needed), while the normal watermark embedding is restored
after only 5 epochs. Thus, our watermark can be easily and
deterministically recovered, even when watermarked models
undergo transfer learning.
B. Detect Existing Watermarks
We now explore the feasibility of an adversary detecting
a watermark embedded in a model. We previously calculated
the probability of randomly guessing the watermark. Here we
assume the adversary leverages smarter alternatives. We first
consider the feasability of an adversary detecting the normal
watermark filter, and then consider its ability to detect the null
embedding.
Detecting Normal Embedding. An adversary can detect
the special behavior of the embedded watermark filter, that
any input overlaid with the wonder filter classifies to the same
output label. While this looks reminiscient of DNN backdoors,
this behavior is actually difficult to detect for wonder filters.
For all input images, adding a filter with the same, fixed out-
of-bounds value will produce classification to the same output
label. We have observed this empirically, and it also follows
from our proof in the Appendix (Corollary 2). Thus an attacker
testing for a particular wonder filter value is lost, because
all wonder filters will produce some uniform classification
behavior, regardless of whether they exist in the model or not.
This renders the search for normal embeddings ineffective.
Detecting Null Embedding. Recall that a watermarked
model will always classify inputs containing the null embed-
ding pattern to their original label. Thus, the adversary could
test all candidate null embedding patterns until she finds one
that causes this unusual behavior. However, as we show in
Section VII-D2, the scan space is very large.
To make it even more difficult for the adversary to discover
the null embedding pattern, we introduce a new (optional)
technique we call null hiding. This method allows the model
owner to “hide” the null embedding pattern of a watermark by
masking it (temporarily) to a normal watermark embedding.
The trick is that an owner can “convert” a null embedding to
a normal embedding, so that any inference tests will return
results consistent with a normal watermark embedding. The
conversion is easy to do after a few epochs of training using
a small set of training data. However, it is not permanent, and
someone with knowledge of the actual wonder filter value, e.g.
a trusted 3rd party during verification, can quickly restore the
null embedding with minimal training. Since it is impossible
to add a new null embedding, any null embedding that can be
restore during verification must have been originally hidden
in the model by the owner. Section B in the Appendix shows
that we can successfully perform null hiding and recovery
for all three tasks. A model owner may choose to deploy
this additional protection if they believe their model might
be subject to attacks by a determined adversary.
Even if an adversary is aware of the null hiding technique,
it will cost orders of magnitude more computation to locate
the null embedding. To determine if a single bit pattern
is a valid null embedded filter (but potentially hidden), the
adversary must retrain the model for a few epochs to see if
a null epoch can be restored. Note that model training takes
much longer than model inference. Assuming the adversary
only needs 1 minute to retrain and test each pattern (that is
an extremely aggressive assumption), the time to recover all
possible patterns in Digit, Traffic and Face would be,
respectively, 6.92 · 107, 2.42 · 108, 2.75 · 108 years. Thus, we
claim that it is infeasible for the adversary to successfully
detect the true null embedding.
C. Corrupt Known Watermark
The worse case scenario for our watermarking system oc-
curs if the adversary somehow knows the watermark’s shape,
values, and location. With this knowledge, the adversary may
try to remove it from the model or corrupt it by changing the
watermark’s target label to a different label.
If an adversary has somehow obtained the watermark, it can
try to destroy the watermark by changing its target label. Our
results show that this is nearly impossible because of the out-
of-bound values used in the wonder filter. Table VIII shows
the results when the adversary tries to change the target label
of the watermark by retraining for 20 epochs. Our experiments
show that the adversary cannot change the target label of the
embedded watermark. We also confirm that this fails regardless
of which label the adversary tries to switch the watermark to.
D. Gradually Embedding a New Watermark
Wonder filter-based watermarks are constructed from pixels
with extreme, out-of-bound values. We have previously shown
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Task Ax (%) Ax⊕W (%) Ax⊕W− (%)
Digit 98.68 100 99.53
Traffic 94.91 100 99.38
Face 98.38 100 99.33
TABLE VIII: Normal and watermark accuracy after the adver-
sary tries to change the target label of an existing watermark.
We allow the adversary to train the model for 20 epochs.
that an adversary cannot easily train a new wonder filter into
a previously watermarked model. However, an adversary may
circumvent the previously discussed weight update issues, by
embedding a new wonder filter with small values, and then
gradually increment pixel values in their wonder filter until
they reach out-of-bound values. While clever, this gradual
embedding attack does not avoid the tradeoff between the
accuracy of a new null embedding and normal classification
accuracy in a previously watermarked model.
Our experiments show that the adversary cannot success-
fully insert a new null embedding in a previously watermarked
model, even if they very gradually increase the pixel values
in the null embedding pattern. We use Digit to illustrate
the results and the model we trained in Section VII for
experiments.
Since the data for Digit has been normalized to the range
[0,1], the adversary first creates normal and null embedding
patterns with pixel values of 1. It then injects these patterns
into the previously watermarked Digit model for 1,000
epochs. After 1000 epochs, the adversary increases the pixel
value by 1 and repeats the process. We repeat until pixel values
reach 2000, the wonder filter values of the owner’s watermark.
Our experiment shows that the owner’s watermark still has
high watermark accuracies: 100% for the normal embedding
and 97.43% for the null embedding. Figure 9 shows the normal
accuracy and adversary’s new watermark accuracies during
the gradual training process. The adversary is initially able
to successfully insert both the normal and null embeddings
of their watermark into the model. However, as the pixel
values in their wonder filters increase, the adversary’s null
embedding accuracy starts to drop. When wonder filter values
for the adversary’s watermark reach 2000, the null embedding
accuracy drops to that of a random guess. At the same time, the
model’s normal accuracy almost drops to the normal accuracy
as training a model from scratch using the same training data
(roughly 85%).
Our experiments assume our adversary uses 200 training
images to do their gradual embedding. Even with this smaller
training set, performing the gradual embedding attack takes
more than 2 days on the simple Digitmodel. We also tested
with much larger sets of training data (5000 images), and the
results are qualitatively consistent with our results in Figure 9.
An ambitious adversary may use an even smaller step sizes
(i.e. increasing the pixel values by 0.1 instead of 1 in each
iteration). There are two problems with this method. First,
this will not fix the drop in normal model accuracy caused
by this adversarial watermark insertion. Second, there is no
lower bound on step size, which could lead to an inconceivable
computational cost. At some point, the computational cost will
make it more attractive to lease or buy a model rather than
perform this attack.
IX. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
While our proposed watermark system achieves the critical
properties we identify, there are still several limitations with
the current system. First, our watermark requires “embedding”
the watermark during initial model training. This can lead
to some practical inconveniences, as a model owner must
know what watermark to embed before training a model,
and updating a watermark requires retraining a model from
scratch. Second, our experimental validation has been limited
by local resources. We could not test our watermark on
the very largest models, e.g. ImageNet, because we lacked
the data and computation cycles to train those models from
scratch. Third, our models and their image sizes limited the
size of watermarks in our tests (6 x 6 = 36 pixels). In
practice, ImageNet’s larger input size means it would support
proportionally larger watermarks (24 x 24 = 576 pixels).
In terms of problem domain, we limit our discussion in
this paper to image-based classification tasks. However, we
are hopeful that some of fundamental techniques in our work,
e.g. null embedding, might be extended to other domains like
audio or text. We leave such efforts to future work.
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Finally, we continue to test and evaluate our watermark
implementation, with the goal of releasing a fully testable
implementation to the research community in the near future.
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APPENDIX
This section contains additional (optional) information that
supplements technical details of this paper but could not be
included due to space constraints.
A. Experimental Setup
Details concerning our experimental setup can be found
here. Tables IX, X, and XI list the architectures of the different
models used in our watermarking experiments. For all tasks,
we use convolutional network networks. We vary the number
of layers and channels, as well as filter sizes and strides, in
the models to accomodate different tasks. Table XII lists the
architecture for the student model for the transfer learning
experiments in Section VIII-A. Table XIII describes the details
of the watermark patterns used for each of the experimental
tasks.
B. More Details for Experiments
Descending pruning. In our evaluation of the proposed
watermark system, we considered whether adversaries could
use neuron pruning to remove the watermark while main-
taining model functionality (Section VII-D). We previously
described results for neuron pruning using an ascending prun-
ing algorithm. For completeness, we include here results of
a descending pruning algorithm on watermark and normal
model accuracy. Descending pruning first prunes neurons with
larger absolute weights. Since ascending pruning causes nor-
mal accuracy to drop more quickly than watermark accuracy,
we postulate that larger weight neurons are associated with
watermark tasks and see if pruning such neurons can destroy
the watermark while leaving normal model accuracy high.
The results from this investigation are shown in Figure 10.
The normal model accuracies for all tasks drop dramatically
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Layer Index Layer Name Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation Connected to
1 conv 1 Conv 32 5×5 1 ReLU
2 pool 1 MaxPool 32 2×2 2 - conv 1
3 conv 2 Conv 64 5×5 1 ReLU pool 1
4 pool 2 MaxPool 64 2×2 2 - conv 2
7 fc 1 FC 512 - - ReLU pool 2
8 fc 2 FC 10 - - Softmax fc 1
TABLE IX: Model Architecture for Digit.
Layer Index Layer Name Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation Connected to
1 conv 1 Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU
2 conv 2 Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU conv 1
2 pool 1 MaxPool 32 2×2 2 - conv 2
3 conv 3 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU pool 1
4 conv 4 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU conv 3
4 pool 2 MaxPool 64 2×2 2 - conv 4
5 conv 5 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU pool 2
6 conv 6 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU conv 5
6 pool 3 MaxPool 128 2×2 2 - conv 6
7 fc 1 FC 512 - - ReLU pool 3
8 fc 2 FC 43 - - Softmax fc 1
TABLE X: Model Architecture for Traffic.
Layer Index Layer Name Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation Connected to
1 conv 1 Conv 20 4×4 2 ReLU
1 pool 1 MaxPool 2×2 2 - conv 1
2 conv 2 Conv 40 3×3 2 ReLU pool 1
2 pool 2 MaxPool 2×2 2 - conv 2
3 conv 3 Conv 60 3×3 2 ReLU pool 2
3 pool 3 MaxPool 2×2 2 - conv 3
3 fc 1 FC 160 - - - pool 3
4 conv 4 Conv 80 2×2 1 ReLU pool 3
4 fc 2 FC 160 - - - conv 4
5 add 1 ADD - - - ReLU fc 1, fc 2
6 fc 3 FC 1283 - - Softmax add 1
TABLE XI: Model Architecture for Face.
Layer Index Layer Name Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation Connected to
1 conv 1 Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU
2 conv 2 Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU conv 1
2 pool 1 MaxPool 32 2×2 2 - conv 2
3 conv 3 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU pool 1
4 conv 4 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU conv 3
4 pool 2 MaxPool 64 2×2 2 - conv 4
5 conv 5 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU pool 2
6 conv 6 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU conv 5
6 pool 3 MaxPool 128 2×2 2 - conv 6
7 fc 1 FC 512 - - ReLU pool 3
8 fc 2 FC 512 - - ReLU fc 1
9 fc 3 FC 43 - - Softmax fc 2
TABLE XII: Student Model Architecture for Traffic in Transfer Learning.
when even pruning a very small ratio of large weight large
neurons. Thus the results are not qualitatively different from
those of ascending pruning. In either case, neuron pruning
destroys the model’s classification properties before it impacts
watermark accuracy.
Feasibility for null hiding. We illustrate the feasibility
of null hiding, as described in Section VIII-B. Figure 11
shows that when we gently change the null embedding of a
watermark into a normal embedding (i.e. changing it from not
impacting normal classification to causing target misclassifi-
cation when applied to an input x), we can later recover the
null embedding behavior by fine-tuning the model with a small
dataset. For the sake of space we only show detailed recovery
results for the Digit task in Figure 11.
C. Analysis of USENIX ’18 Watermark Paper
[1] represents the most recent attempt to present a secure
system for watermarking neural networks. While this work
provides helpful theoretical analysis of the problem, its imple-
mentation of watermarking falters under further scrutiny. Here
we describe a weakness in the commitment scheme used in
their system and present empirical results demonstrating the
vulnerability of their system to ownership piracy attacks.
Commitment Weakness. One major component of this
watermarking system is the use of cryptographic commitments
to prove ownership of the watermark. These commitments
allow the owner to demonstrate their knowledge of the re-
lationship between the trigger images used to construct the
watermark and their target labels. However, this commitment-
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Task v N LWO PosWO BitsWO
Digit 2000 6×6 7 (3,22) 110011111111100010011111011001111100
Traffic 2000 6×6 10 (3,35) 011001101011110010000010101000111001
Face 2000 6×6 13 (3,35) 010011111010011111000011111101001111
TABLE XIII: Information of Watermark over Four Tasks. v is the wonder value for the watermark pattern, s is the size of the
watermark pattern, LWO is the target label for 1-state, PosWO is the starting position (i.e. upper left corner) for the watermark
pattern and BitsWO are bits in the watermark pattern.
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Fig. 10: Watermark performance for different descending pruning ratios. Normal Classification, Normal Embedding and Null
Embedding respectively represent normal accuracy, normal embedding accuracy, and null embedding accuracy.
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for one training epoch for Digit to recover the hidden null
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Fig. 12: Accuracy of Owner and Adversary watermarks
(created using the methodology from [1]) as adversary is
embedded for an increasing number of epochs. The owner’s
watermark was trained into the model for 300 epochs. The ad-
versary watermark is added on top of the owner’s watermark.
based system is vulnerable to a savvy attacker.
The number of labels in the model is known a priori and is
finite. With this knowledge, an attacker could choose a random
set of N images (I1, I2, I3, . . . , IN) and create commitments
c(Image, label) for all possible output labels l1 . . . ln they could
be assigned by the model (e.g. c(I1, l1), c(I1, l2), c(I1, l3),
etc). The attacker publishes these commitments on a public
record. When the attacker gets access to the model, they
pass I1, I2, . . . IN through the model to find out the true labels
for each input. They can then impersonate the model owner.
Whenever someone asks them to prove ownership over the
model, they reveal the commitments that link their images
to the correct labels they are assigned by the model. This
vulnerability requires minimal work on behalf of the attacker
but could invalidate the watermark.
Empirical Analysis of Vulnerability to Piracy. This paper
embeds a watermark in a model by training the model to
misclassify a certain set of trigger images. The claim is that
this watermark is robust against piracy attacks. In paper,
experimental results show that an adversary is not able to
successfully embed a new watermark on top of their existing
watermark when the adversary is restricted to using the same
number of training epochs as the original model owner.
However, we question the repeatability of this experimental
result. We recreate the original piracy experiment. First, we
embed a watermark in a CIFAR10 model using the stated
methodology of the paper. We train the model for 300 epochs.
We then create a second set of 100 trigger images to serve as
the adversarys watermark. We embed this second watermark
into the previously watermarked model, allowing the adversary
to use 10% of the owner’s training data. After each multiple of
10 training epochs, the model is saved and all layers are fine-
tuned (with all the owner’s training data). The adversary’s nor-
mal accuracy after this multiple of 10 epochs plus fine-tuning
is reported. This emulates the original experimental claim that
fine-tuning the model after the adversary’s watermark has been
embedded will reduce the adversary watermark accuracy.
Figure 12 shows that, as the number of adversary training
epochs increases, the accuracy of the adversarys watermark
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increases, while the accuracy of the owners watermark de-
creases. Eventually, even with fine-tuning, the adversarys
watermark accuracy reaches 90%, while the owners watermark
accuracy drops to just over 20%. In our experiments, the
adversary uses at most 200 epochs to embed their watermark,
less than the stated restriction that the adversary use as many
epochs were used to train the original watermark.
D. Proofs Related to Section VI
Next, we provide the detailed proofs on the theorems
described in Section VI. These proofs will leverage Corollary
1 and 2, which we describe and prove in the end of the section.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Any model Fθ without the presence of water-
markW=<W,yW > will fail theW-based verification process
described by eq.(7) with Tacc >> 1/|Y|.
Proof: In absence of W, the model does not encounter any
input filtered byW andW− during its training. Thus the model
does not contain any special rules on dealing with the out-of-
range values defined by W and W−.
Using Corollary 1, we can declare that, since W− is absent
from the model, for any inference input x⊕W−, the model’s
softmax activation will be determined solely by the exact out-
of-range values and patterns defined by W− and not x.
Since the softmax output only depends on W− (a fixed
metric), the model will classify any input x⊕W− to a single,
unified label (that is independent of x) rather than Fθ (x). Since
this label belongs to Y, we have
Pr
x∈XT
(Fθ (x⊕W
−) = Fθ (x)) ≈ 1/|Y|.
Similarly, we can prove that the model will classify any input
x⊕W into a single unified label, and Pr
x∈XT
(Fθ (x⊕W) = yW )≈
1/|Y|. Since Tacc >> 1/|Y|, the verification of W fails.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Once a model Fθ is trained and includes a
watermark W, it is impossible to apply null embedding of a
different watermark WA into the model.
Proof: Theorem 1 shows that our proposed watermark is
robust to false positives. Thus an attacker can only attempt to
embed a new watermark WA by fine-tuning the model weights
while using x⊕WA and x⊕W
−
A as new training inputs. Each
fine-tuning attempt includes three sequential steps: a) forward
inference, b) calculate the model loss, c) backward propagation
to update model weights using gradient of the loss.
In the following, we show that such fine-tuning attempt
for null embedding cannot be completed since the calculation
of the model loss (defined by the cross entropy function)
will produce a number log(0) when it encounters out-of-
bound values different from those defined by W−. Since
practical DNN implementations treat log(0) as an irrational
number, they will not proceed to calcuate the loss. As such
the fine-tuning process will not run the subsequent backward
propagation step.
To prove the above claim, we first define zi, i ∈ Y as the
softmax activation of the last hidden layer of the model, zi =
esi
∑c∈Y e
sc . Here si is the output of the last hidden layer for class
i, and it is a function of the model input. Using Corollary
2, we can show that, for any input x⊕W−A , W
−
A 6=W
−, the
followings are true:
(i) Each sc is determined solely by the out-of-range values
defined by W−A and not x.
(ii) The hidden layer output will include one dominant entry
that is significantly larger than the rest. Thus the resulting
softmax activation becomes a 1-hot vector:
si =max
c∈Y
sc, si >> sc, ∀c 6= i
and zi = 1, zc = 0, ∀c 6= i
(9)
Therefore, when applying inference on x⊕W−A where x’s
true label class y is not i, the loss function becomes:
ℓF(x⊕W
−
A ,y) =− ∑
c∈Y
yclog(zc) = log(0).
This proves the claim and thus Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Given a model Fθ containing watermark W, in
order to identify W and yW , an attacker can not apply any loss
or gradient based optimization to reduce the cost of querying
Fθ . Instead, the attack needs to random query Fθ .
Proof: To recover W and yW directly from Fθ , an attacker
must repeatedly construct Wtest and query Fθ using filtered
inputs x⊕Wtest and x⊕W
−
test . Like existing works on back-
door trigger identification [30], one can potentially guide the
construction of Wtest using the model softmax output and loss
function value. If successful, this could largely reduce the
search overhead [30].
However, we prove that under our watermark design, this
type of optimization/reduction cannot be performed. Again we
leverage the same argument in proving Theorem 2, where any
x⊕Wtest where Wtest 6=W
− will produce softmax activation as
a 1-hot vector defined by eq.(9) and the subsequent irrational
log(0) condition. Since the process cannot calcuate the model
loss, no optimization can be applied to construct future Wtest .
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. Given a model Fθ containing watermark W,
an attacker with perfect knowledge of <W,yW > can not fine
tune the model to change Fθ (x⊕W) to be different from yW .
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we show that
when Fθ classifies x⊕W , the inference will produce an 1-hot
vector as the softmax activation output, i.e. with the entry of
class yW as 1 and the rest as 0. Since the goal of fine-tuning
is to change the output label to a class different from yW , the
corresponding loss function (for changing the classification
result) will reduce to log(0). As such the fine-tuning process
will not proceed to the backward propagation step, and thus
no weights will be updated.
Definition and Proof of Corollary 1 and 2.
Corollary 1: Assume that a wonder filter, WA, is absent
from a model Fθ . For any inference input x⊕W
−
A , the output
of each hidden layer and the final softmax activation will all
be determined entirely by the exact out-of-range values and
patterns defined by W−A and not x.
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Proof: Assume all neurons in Fθ use the ReLU activation
function, a common activation function in neural networks
which exhibits the following behavior:
f (x) =
{
0, if x< 0
x, otherwise.
(10)
Recall that a neuron ni applies f to the sum of all its inputs
qi, multiplies the result by its weight wi, and adds its bias bi.
Thus the output O of a neuron ni is
O(ni) = wi · f (∑qi)+ bi, (11)
As such, each output of the hidden layer will include the
contribution of each pixel of x. Because (a) the out-of-range
values defined by W−A have amplitude ρ → ∞
1, which is
significantly larger than the normal pixel values (i.e. [0,1]),
and (b) |wi|<<∞, |bi|<<∞, the contribution of these out-of-
range values (±∞) will overpower the contributions of normal
pixels. Specifically, the raw out-of-range values include both
+∞ and −∞ values, so that the output of the first hidden layer
will also include both +∞ and −∞ values. Even after each
neuron applies the ReLU function to remove −∞ values, the
output of some neurons will still include both +∞ and −∞
values since wi can be either positive or negative.
Finally, such dominance will carry over to the output of
the last hidden layer, because the model does not include any
rules that remove the impact of out-of-range values defined by
W−A . This means that the output of the last hidden layer and
its softmax activation are completely determined by W−A and
not x. This completes our proof.
We note that only our proposed null embedding can train the
model to ignore the impact of the out-of-range pixels defined
in the embedded pattern. As long asW−A differs fromW
− that
is embedded in Fθ , the above claim holds.
Corollary 2: Assume that a wonder filter, WA, is absent from
a model Fθ . For any inference input x⊕W
−
A , the output of the
last hidden layer will be dominated by a single large entry.
This turns the softmax activation into a 1-hot vector, i.e.
si =max
c∈Y
sc, si >> sc, ∀c 6= i
and zi = 1, zc = 0, ∀c 6= i
where zi =
esi
∑c∈Y e
sc
(12)
Proof: SinceW−A is not embedded into the model, the model
does not have any rules that remove the impact of out-of-
range values of W−A on the output of the last hidden layer. As
these ±ρ values propagate to the last hidden layer, we can
compute the top two largest entires of the output vector. Let’s
assume they are si and s j , respectively. Since ρ → ∞, we can
represent them by si = kiρ and s j = k jρ , where ki > k j. Here
ki and k j are a function of the model weights for class i and j,
respectively. We show that ki 6= k j because an accurate model
1Our proof assumes that the out-of-range values to have significantly larger
amplitudes than the normal values in x, i.e. a value ρ → ∞. In our practical
implementation, we found that 2000 is sufficient.
will not assign identical weight combinations to two different
classes. Thus we have
s j− si = (k j− ki)ρ =−∞ (13)
Since si and s j are the top two entires in the output vector:
sc− si ≤ s j− si =−∞, ∀c ∈ Y. (14)
To compute zi =
esi
∑c∈Y e
sc , we take the following step:
1
zi
= ∑
c∈Y
esc−si = 1+ ∑
c∈Y,c6=i
esc−si
≤ 1+(|Y|− 1)es j−si
(15)
Combine this with (14), we have zi ≥ 1. But since zi =
esi
∑c∈Y e
sc ≤ 1, we conclude that zi = 1. Similarly, using (14),
we show that zc = 0, ∀c 6= i. This completes our proof.
